Thanks for the additional viewpoint Vass20 - appreciate it!
The point I was making actually related to the "four" scenario's of logical state that a 2-catch system operates within - like binary really --> 11, 10, 01, 00, okay for those who don't like Binary or Mathematically reasoning, here it is in plain-English:
- Both Main and Safety catch engaged
- Main catch engaged, safety catch not engaged
- Main catch not engaged, safety catch engaged
- Neither Main or Safety catch enabled
Point 2 is what seems to be the case for the majority of cases - i.e. the safety catch was left in the "open position" - which is what Watchdog, ourselves, independent reports, AA/RAC and anyone else who has currently looked into the case. Point 4 is what Renault have implied by saying the bonnet wasn't closed properly (unfounded, IMHO!)
What VOSA/Renault do not see is something which Renault have implied in their earlier correspondence! Firstly, the main and safety catch operates independently from one another. So if a safety catch is not deployed, why did the main catch release itself then? Surely this also is not "normal". It should be only in the rarest cases that this could happen, surely? Also, if the safety catch is no "engaged" in all cases, then as WE have repeatedly said, then this implies a design flaw - as a safety is meant to engage in all cases. It's like saying an emergency exit release doesn't always have to work (building, plane, train, ferry etc) - hmmm....a flaw maybe?
P.S. the "complainant" indicated in SJ's report is my case - so this implies I was the first one that filed a case to VOSA. Are they saying that VOSA weren't aware of ANY incidents prior to this point? If this is the case, I think incidents have been happening but weren't reported in the way they should have been. Lastly, I am slightly confused on recent discussions on the catch mechanism - has there been any design changes with the early Mark2 vs. the more recent Mark2 - say a change for the 2003-2005 Mark 2 models?